The H I Mind Theory of Focused-Consciousness

John Cochrane – 13 May 2025

Abstract

The H I Mind Theory of Focused-Consciousness is the first of four complementary but independent models that aim to describe various facets of human consciousness. Each theory within the H I Mind framework addresses a distinct dimension of conscious experience, and while they are mutually supportive, they do not rely upon one another for internal coherence. The present theory introduces a structural-functional model of consciousness, designed to account for the diversity of human conscious states while proposing a working definition of “core consciousness” grounded in current neuroscientific and cognitive frameworks.

1. Introduction

Consciousness remains one of the most complex phenomena in neuroscience and philosophy of mind. A growing body of research supports a modular, distributed, and dynamic architecture of cognitive function (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Tononi et al., 2016). Within this context, the H I Mind Theory of Focused-Consciousness offers a novel model grounded in evolutionary psychology and behavioural neuroscience. It proposes that conscious experience can be understood in terms of five functional "focuses"—semi-autonomous systems that structure cognitive activity in response to specific adaptive challenges.

2. Structural Overview of the H I Mind Model

The H I Mind Model assumes a layered architecture of cognition. Beneath the conscious and semi-conscious strata lies the non-conscious (or subconscious) domain, which is conceived as fast, automatic, and inaccessible to introspection—a view consistent with dual-process theories of cognition (Kahneman, 2011; Bargh and Morsella, 2008).Above this foundation are five interactive conscious "focuses" that govern distinct modes of cognitive activity and contribute to human adaptability. These focuses operate under conditions of attentional limitation and compete or collaborate for access to central executive processing (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Baddeley, 2003).

3. The Five Focuses of Consciousness

3.1 The Social Focus

This domain facilitates pre-verbal, relational cognition necessary for bonding, cooperation, and observational learning. Rooted in early mammalian and primate evolution, it parallels social cognition networks involving the medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction (Frith and Frith, 2007).

3.2 The Aspirational Focus

Linked to spontaneous creativity, play, and exploration, this focus supports mental simulation of future scenarios and alternative realities. It aligns with brain activity in the default mode network (DMN) and right-lateralized associative cortices involved in imagination and divergent thinking (Beaty et al., 2016).

3.3 The Cultural Focus

This focus underpins language acquisition, rule-based learning, and large-scale cooperation. It reflects the influence of structured knowledge systems and corresponds to executive and semantic networks primarily lateralized to the left hemisphere (Binder et al., 2009).

3.4 The Noble Focus

Concerned with moral reasoning, altruism, and transcendent experience, this focus extends aspirational capacities toward values not anchored in immediate self-interest. Neuroscientific evidence links this focus to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and regions involved in prosocial behaviour and self-transcendence (Immordino-Yang et al., 2009; Yaden et al., 2017).

3.5 The Planning Focus (Core Consciousness)

This focus is responsible for moment-to-moment awareness, decision-making, and coordination of the other four focuses. It mirrors the concept of a "central executive" in cognitive science and integrates input from multiple neural systems (Dehaene et al., 2017). Core Consciousness is proposed to emerge from dynamic interactions between hemispheric systems and subcortical structures via the thalamus and corpus callosum.

4. Hemispheric and Functional Associations

Empirical studies suggest that lateralization of cognitive function contributes to specialization across domains. The Social and Cultural Focuses show affinity with left-hemisphere dominance in language and social norm adherence, while the Aspirational and Noble Focuses engage right-hemisphere structures linked to emotion, creativity, and holistic processing (Gazzaniga, 2000). Core Consciousness, conceptualized as the supervisory focus, likely emerges from interhemispheric integration, consistent with models of consciousness as a global workspace (Baars, 1997; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).

5. Core Consciousness: A Functional Definition

Within this model, Core Consciousness is defined as the self-referential executive process that manages the dynamic interplay of the other focuses. It does not rely on their specific structure for existence but emerges as a necessity for resolving competing internal motivations. This notion resonates with current approaches that view consciousness as an adaptive tool for behavioural flexibility and self-regulation (Graziano, 2013; Tononi, 2004).

6. Conclusion

The H I Mind Theory of Focused-Consciousness offers a modular framework that accommodates the complexity of human experience without reducing it to a single function or region. By situating distinct focuses of mind within an evolutionary and neurocognitive context, the theory provides a plausible foundation for mapping conscious processes onto neural substrates. While the model remains theoretical, it offers testable hypotheses and invites interdisciplinary investigation across neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy of mind.

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